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INTRODUCTION
Consider Notice R. 873.1 Issued by the Commissioner of the South Afri-
can Police, this notice expanded the category of "subversive statements" set
out, and forbidden, in regulations earlier promulgated to enforce the state of
emergency in South Africa. As the Notice reflects, its object was to enable the
state to silence campaigns for the release of people being held in detention
without trial. Under the Notice and the regulations, any statement inciting or
encouraging, or calculated to have the effect of inciting or encouraging, any-
one to commit any of the acts specified in the Notice, acts that supported the
release of detainees, became a subversive statement.
It is not difficult to understand why the South African government would
want to quash opposition to its use of detention without trial. Notice R. 873,
therefore, is interesting not so much for what it does - though that retains a
grotesque fascination - as for how it does it. This notice exemplifies a princi-
• Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law. J.D. Harvard University
School of Law. I want to thank Richard Abel, Geoff Budlender, Martin Chanock, Dennis
Davis, Andrew Dwyer, Gail Gerhart, David Goldberg, Karen Johnson, Gilbert Marcus,
Anthony Mathews, Henry Monaghan, Khanya Motshabi, Nancy Rosenbloom and Lucie White
for their helpful suggestions bearing on this Article, Nadine Havenga for her translations of
Afrikaans legal materials, and Columbia Law School for financial support. An earlier version
of this Article was presented to a forum at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Modem Lan-
guage Association in 1989. I explore the issues of this Article further in my book, IN A TzmE OF
TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA's STATE OF EMERGENCY (forthcoming
1991).
1. Notice R. 873, 262 Gov't Gazette No. 10713 (Apr. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Notice R.
873]. A copy of the English text of this notice (arranged to fit on one page instead of on the
original two) is appended to this Article.
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pal South African method of achieving this and other unattractive objectives:
the use of law. Compared to other tyrants, Joseph Lelyveld writes, "South
Africa's white rulers have been unusually conscientious about securing statu-
tory authority for their abuses."2 In the words of the historian Martin Cha-
nock, "[t]he oppressions of apartheid have, until the beginnings of its
disintegration, characteristically been imposed not by the random terror of the
death squad, but by the routine and systematic processes of courts and
bureaucrats." 3
It would be a mistake, however, to think of South African law simply as a
tool of the government. On the contrary, the role of law in South African
oppression is a continually contested one, for not only the government but also
its opponents seek to invoke law on their behalf. It does not seem inevitable
that the law would become such a field of struggle. An unjust state might
dispense with legal forms more totally than South Africa has done, or on the
other hand, might arm itself with the irresistible legal authority of a leviathan.
This Article seeks to explain why the government has chosen to rely so heavily
on legal regulation to maintain its power over an oppressed black majority,
why those who oppose the government have been able to muster a significant
legal response, and how the conflicting forces of the state and its opposition
have shaped the law and the legal culture of South Africa. These are large
questions, to which I will offer only tentative answers, but I believe that a close
examination of the wording and the effects of one legal text, Notice R. 873,
against the background of South African life will help us understand the am-
biguous role of law in South African society.
I will begin, in Section I of this Article, by sketching the government's
reasons for using the law as a method of social control. Among these, un-
doubtedly, is the sheer effectiveness of legal regulation. In South Africa, how-
ever, the rule of law is not only a tool but also a value, and I will suggest that
South Africa's use of the law reflects the desire of South African whites to
seem, and even to be, faithful to this value.
A general understanding of the government's reasons for using the law
does not in itself tell us what sorts of laws the government will choose to
enact, and in Section II, I will look closely at Notice R. 873 in order to outline
several salient features of the laws the government adopts and suggest the pur-
poses which those features serve. As we will see, Notice R. 873's distortion of
language and its convolution may in part grow out of the government's desire
to mask its enterprise as much as possible. Yet the Notice's elaborate detail
undercuts such masking, and I will argue that this detail both expresses the
government's deep apprehension of popular onslaught and reflects its anticipa-
tion of legal challenge.
Because the laws employed by the government thus reflect not only its
2. J. LELYVELD, MOVE YOUR SHADOW-SouTH AFRICA, BLACK AND WHITE 81 (1985).
3. Chanock, Writing South African Legal History. A Prospectus, 30 J. Ai. HIsT. 265, 265
(1989).
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own desires but its anticipation of opposition, we must understand the opposi-
tion to understand the law. The rise of popular mobilization against
apartheid, however, is not my focus here. Instead, in Section M, I will seek to
explain why anti-apartheid forces in South Africa have been able to make con-
siderable use of the law against the government. I will argue that South Afri-
can law provides lawyers with surprisingly supple doctrinal support for
limiting government oppression. I will also suggest that the structure and tra-
ditions of the legal profession and of the courts have supplied important but-
tresses for individual lawyers' courageous decisions to use the law against the
government as well as for the willingness of some judges to render decisions
vindicating such positions. The upshot of the availability of useful doctrines
and of lawyers ready to use them has been that legal challenges to the govern-
ment's efforts to use the law are widespread. While these challenges are often
unsuccessful, we will see through the example of Notice R. 873 itself that their
results can still be significant.
While the law is shaped by the conflict between the government and the
anti-apartheid opposition, that conflict is hardly confined to the courts. The
force of the idea of law can be measured in part by the force of principles or
practices that deny the obligation to obey the law, and in Section IV, I will
argue that such challenges to legality have considerable support on both sides
of South Africa's ideological and racial divide. In this light, I will suggest that
the political struggle underway in South Africa not only shapes its law but
also imports into the legal culture itself the claims of illegality.4
As this Article goes to press, blacks and whites in South Africa are mov-
ing towards the formal start of negotiations which may lead to the transforma-
tion of much of the legal system and legal culture I describe here. I write,
therefore, as the ice of South Africa's winter cracks, but there is still much to
be done before summer comes. It remains important for us to understand the
ways in which law can be bent to the service of oppression, and yet also in-
voked on behalf of liberty, in South Africa and elsewhere.
I.
THE RoOTs OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RELIANCE ON LAW
South Africa has erected an immense edifice of discriminatory and op-
pressive law.' For example, South African statutes classify each South Afri-
can by race,6 specify the "group area" in which she must reside,' and specify
that whites, so-called "Coloureds" (of mixed race), and Indians, but not the
4. The "law" that I discuss in this Article is the dominant legal system in South Africa, a
system refined in Africa but rooted in Roman-Dutch and English law. I do not address here the
continuing significance of African customary law, though this source of law retains considerable
importance for many of South Africa's people.
5. For a comprehensive, though already somewhat dated, overview of this body of law, see
J. DUGARD, HumAN RIGHTs AND THE SoUTH AFUCAN LEGAL ORDER (1978).
6. Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950.
7. Group Areas Act No. 36 of 1966.
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African majority of the population, have the right to vote in national elec-
tions.8 Other statutes authorize detention without trial;9 permit the govern-
ment to ban organizations, 10 to forbid indoor and outdoor gatherings and to
bar particular citizens from their normal work or social lives; I I and empower
the government to declare a state of emergency during which still greater in-
trusions on civil liberties are permissible. 2 Notice R. 873 is, in fact, an exer-
cise of this emergency authority, under a state of emergency first declared in
1985 and then, after one interruption, repeatedly renewed until June, 1990 -
and in effect in parts of South Africa almost to the present day.13
One explanation for the government's apparent desire to work its will
largely through legal rather than extralegal coercion is deeply and properly
cynical. Legal regulation can be effective.14 Law is the characteristic mode of
regulation in a complex, industrial, modem nation. South Africa has a sophis-
ticated legal system in place for the direction and resolution of a wide array of
nonpolitical matters, and using similar mechanisms to deal with the enormous
tasks of establishing and defending apartheid must have seemed, and may well
have been, natural and efficient. From this perspective, what is unusual about
South Africa is not that it achieves its governmental objectives through the
8. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983, § 52.
9. See, e.g., Internal Security Act No. 74 of 1982, §§ 28-29.
10. Id. § 4.
11. Id. §§ 18-22, 46; see A. MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 124-25, 141 (1986).
12. Public Safety Act No. 3 of 1953.
13. The state of emergency declared on July 21, 1985 was applicable only to certain areas
of South Africa, and was liftd on March 7, 1986. See Human Rights Index, 2 S. APR. J. HuM.
RTs. 252, 252 (1986). A new state of emergency covering the entire country took effect on June
12, 1986, however, and with annual renewals remained in place until June 1990. See Human
Rights Index, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 261, 261 (1989).
As part of the recent opening in South African politics, the government early in 1990 cut
back on its emergency powers. See Security Amendment Emergency Regulations 1990, Proc.
R. 18, 296 Gov't Gazette No. 12287 (Feb. 3, 1990). Among other changes, the government
withdrew the emergency media regulations which had contained the prohibition on "subversive
statements," the prohibition to which Notice R. 873 had been linked. See Proc. R. 19, 296
Gov't Gazette No. 12287 (Feb. 3, 1990). Then in June 1990 the state of emergency was re-
newed again, but this time in only one province of South Africa, Natal. See Proc. R. 97, 300
Gov't Gazette No. 12524 (June 8, 1990) (declaring state of emergency in Natal, and promulgat-
ing emergency regulations).
A little over two months later, however, in response to fierce fighting among South Afri-
can blacks, the government declared the existence of "unrest areas" in a sizable number of
localities elsewhere in South Africa. At the same time it promulgated "unrest regulations"
which closely resemble past "emergency" regulations. See Notice R. 2062, 302 Gov't Gazette
No. 12722 (Aug. 24, 1990) (designating unrest areas and setting out unrest regulations). The
government continues to use its "unrest area" powers, but it has now ended the state of emer-
gency in Natal. See Proc. R. 186, 304 Gov't Gazette No. 12802 (Oct. 18, 1990); Wren, De
Klerk Lifts Emergency Rules in Natal Province, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Mean-
while, however, the "independent homeland" of Bophuthatswana maintains its own state of
emergency. Human Rights Commission, 3 HuM. RTS. UPDATE (No. 9), at 1 (October 1990).
14. For Martin Chanock, "in the South African state law is a way of creating, extending
and exercising power rather than limiting and controlling it." Chanock, supra note 3, at 267.
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elaborate use of law - many nations do that - but rather that its objectives
are so repellent.
South African law may be particularly efficient, from the point of view of
the state, because it tends to confer such broad discretion on state officials.
For example, the elaborate array of laws which until recently governed blacks'
right to live and work in urban areas was "designed to create a system of
government by administration rather than by rules of law."1 5 The law that
governed blacks conferred broad discretion on the officials who did the gov-
erning; 6 all the more reason to find resort to the law convenient. The essence
of the emergency security machinery has also been said to be "an attempt to
confer upon the police the capacity to operate in the grey areas between an
(extended) legality and wanton illegality, to impose order without law."17
Taken to this extreme, South Africa's use of law verges on the legalization of
illegality.
Law's efficacy, however, is not the only reason for its embrace by the
government. In addition, South Africa's reliance on the law enables it to as-
sert its fidelity to the principle of the rule of law, an ideal that seeks to guaran-
tee that the power of government is restrained by the staying hand of legal
rights. South Africa does in fact make this claim. 8 As one South African
judge has commented,
I know that it is popular, particularly for South African politicians
and diplomats, to proclaim with considerable pride (vicarious pride,
I should say) that whatever else can be said about South Africa, its
legal system and its system of courts and justice is above criticism. 9
This image of fidelity to the rule of law is of value for three distinct rea-
sons. First, the claim to moral standing may help to make law an efficient
method of controlling people, for if they accept the rightness of the controls
then they will obey by choice rather than only by coercion. The use of law, on
this account, legitimizes the government's enterprise.2" Even under the weight
15. Dean, The Legal Regime Governing Urban Africans in South Africa-An Administra-
tive-Law Perspective, 1984 ACTA JURIDICA 105, 129 (1985). The hateful "pass laws" and other
aspects - though by no means all - of the legal apparatus regulating blacks' right to live and
work in urban areas were repealed in 1986. For an early appraisal of the new legal regime, see
generally Schoombee & Davis, Abolishing Influx Control-Fundamental Or Cosmetic Change?,
2 S. AR. J. HuM. RTs. 208 (1986).
16. See Dean, supra note 15, at 120-23.
17. Haysom, Legal Intervention & the State of Emergency, in DEVELOpmENrS IN EmER-
GENCY LAW 1, 2 (N. Haysom & C. Plasket eds. 1989).
18. See J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 42 (describing "a sixty-eight page booklet" published
in 1968 by South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs "with the purpose of showing that the
Rule of Law had not been discarded in South Africa").
19. Kriegler, Extracts of an Address Delivered By Mr. Justice J C Krigler At The Annual
General Meeting Of Lawyers For Human Rights, Pretoria, 16 November 1985, 2 S. AFR. J. Hum.
Rrs. 204, 205 (1986).
20. There is, Alan Hyde comments, "a large body of theory that rests on the supposedly
significant contribution of law and legal institutions to popular belief in legitimacy and hence to
political action or nonaction of various types." Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Saciol-
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of oppression, there is some evidence that black South Africans do accord
some respect to the laws that oppress them. 1 There are also, however, fre-
quent suggestions that blacks have lost respect for the law because of its injus-
tice.2 2 Whether or not blacks can still be impressed by South African legal
forms, it is possible that the government believes that they can be-and so the
hope of inducing black obedience may be one motive for the use of law.
23
Second, the use of law may also reassure South African whites about the
fairness of the power being exercised by the government. Some whites might
otherwise be more likely to challenge the government's acts; others might sim-
ply lose heart and so give less firm support to the government's policies. Both
groups may be quicker to accept the propriety of oppression carried out
through the forms of the legal process than they would be to approve of
wholly extralegal government action.
But why would South African whites be more disposed to endorse op-
pression if it is implemented through the law? The most straightforward rea-
son would be simply that South African whites, or many of them, genuinely
value the law. Their feelings might have quite diverse roots. Surely many
white South Africans, even government supporters, put some stock in the
ideal of the rule of law. The ideal of a government of laws and not of men is
too widespread in Western culture for it to be likely that this principle has no
force in South Africa; indeed, the frequency with which the rule of law is
invoked by South Africans critical of government policies itself suggests that it
is part of South African culture.24
At the same time, many South Africans, who set little store by the no-
tions of human rights often implicit in the idea of the rule of law, may still
ogy of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379, 383-85. Hyde himself has great doubts about the validity of
this theory, but I will not enter this theoretical debate here.
21. For one such piece of evidence of South African blacks' possible respect for South
African laws, see White, To Learn & Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering & Power,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 728 & n. 118. White thoughtfully considers whether the Driefontein
villagers' expressions of deference to the authority of South African law were sincere or not. Id.
If they were sincere, White does not suggest that they reflected a belief on the part of blacks that
apartheid laws werejust. Rather, she sees attitudes towards these laws as being, perhaps, a form
of "ideological static," blunting people's perception of the possibility and rightfulness of polit-
ical challenge. See Letter from Lucie White to Stephen Ellmann (Mar. 8, 1990) (on file with
author).
22. See, ag., Kriegler, supra note 19, at 205; Chanock, supra note 3, at 267-68. Nelson
Mandela, himself an attorney, challenged the right of the Court to try him for criminal charges
in 1962, and told the presiding magistrate that he felt that he was "a black man in a white man's
court." N. MANDELA, "Black Man in a White Court," First Court Statement, 1962, in THE
STRUGGLE Is MY LIFE 125, 129 (1978).
23. Such a motive may underlie the 1988 decision by the South African Commissioner of
Police to ban a protest meeting related to the judgment in a major treason trial then underway.
The Commissioner observed "that the manner in which the judgment was being attacked had
the effect of heightening emotions and making the administration of justice 'suspect.'" Cam-
eron, Marcus & van Zyl Smit, The Administration of Justice, Law Reform & Jurisprudence, in
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW - 1988, at 500, 521-22 (1989) (quoting The Citi-
zen, Dec. 7, 1988).
24. See J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 37.
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want their government to act in accordance with law, because they see rule by
law as part of an appropriate system for ordering society.25 John Dugard sug-
gests that many Afrikaner lawyers would draw from their Dutch-Reformed
religious heritage and from the Roman-Dutch legal tradition a rejection of
"the notion of 'fundamental rights' accruing to the individual [as] against
([s]tate, government) authority" and would instead embrace "Christian gov-
ernment, necessarily including juridical ordering."26 The use of law permits
or constitutes this juridical ordering. Joseph Lelyveld captures the flavor of
this reason for the employment of law:
Most whites are uncomprehending of the argument that law is
brought into disrepute when it is used to destroy habeas corpus, the
presumption of innocence, equality before the law, and various other
basic freedoms. Law is law. It's the principle of order and therefore
of civilization, the antithesis advanced by the white man to what he
knows as a matter of tribal lore, his own, to be Africa's fundamental
thesis: anarchy. Excessive liberty, in his view, is what threatens civi-
lization; law is what preserves it."
Third, the claim of adherence to the rule of law speaks to international
concerns. South African policymakers must consider the reactions and the
potential sanctions of foreign observers, and this audience may be impressed
by government according to law. Moreover, the risk of international reaction
also has a significance for South Africans that goes beyond political or eco-
nomic considerations. Many South Africans of all political stripes are very
conscious of the world beyond their borders. Many South African whites,
especially, want to consider themselves part of the Western world, faithful to
its traditions and sharing in its aspirations and achievements.28 The interna-
tional boycott of South African sport has been so painful to some in part be-
cause it denied white South Africans membership in the club. Similarly the
cultural boycott of South Africa has been painful even (perhaps particularly)
for opponents of apartheid, and has now been modified in order to permit
progressive, anti-apartheid artists to share in the world's cultural develop-
25. Among the possible reasons why South Africans might see the use of law as appropri-
ate, as Richard Abel suggests, is simply that South Africa has used this method for so long that
it has now itself acquired the status of a tradition. See Letter from Richard Abel to Stephen
Ellmann (Sept. 5, 1989) (on file with the author).
26. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 41 (quoting Venter, The Withering of the "Rule of Law,"
8 SPECULUM JuRis 69, 86-87 (1973)).
27. J. LELYVELD, supra note 2, at 81.
28. Joseph Lelyveld describes an issue of Fair Lady, a popular South African magazine
read mainly by whites, which featured a series of photographs taken in Spain, of a black South
African model. " 'he Fair Lady team' had been flown to Madrid from Johannesburg, a cap-
tion said, by Iberia Airways.... To do it justice, FairLady has a social conscience that periodi-
cally permits it to slip in an article about hunger in the black rural areas. But when it hands an
Iberia ticket to a black model, it is imitating Vogue, showing its readers that they have risen
above apartheid and joined a wider world." Id. at 38-39.
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ments.29 Lawyers too are subject to this desire for a place in the sun of the
Western world: we can hear its reverberations in the 1970 boast of a South
African judge that he was "told on good authority that the English judges,
who are undoubtedly the most eminent judges in the world, consider only the
South African judges as their equals."' 3 0 Each interference with the ideal of
the rule of law takes a certain toll on this international cultural affiliation, and
I suggest that South Africa oppresses by law in part to stake a claim to sharing
in the Western tradition of the rule of law.
For all these reasons, the resort to law as an instrument of policy has deep
roots in South Africa, and could not be completely abandoned without great
difficulty - though as we will see, it certainly can be substantially undercut.
As this discussion has already indicated, however, South Africa is distinctive
not only for its use of the law but for certain features of the laws it has chosen
to adopt. To understand how South African law is shaped by the concerns
and even fears of its drafters, let us turn to the text of Notice R. 873.
II.
THE PRESSURES THAT SHAPE SoUTH AFRICAN LAW
Notice R. 873 is designed to quell campaigns for the release of detainees,
in the following, rather intricate way. In Proclamation R. 224 of December
11, 1986, the South African State President had declared that any statement
which "incited or encouraged or which is calculated to have the effect of incit-
ing or encouraging members of the public" to commit a wide range of acts in
opposition to the government was a subversive statement. These acts were
listed in the Proclamation, but the State President also declared that the Com-
missioner of Police could add to the list "any other act or omission identified
by the Commissioner by notice... as an act or omission which has the effect
of threatening the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order or of
delaying the termination of the state of emergency." 3'
In Notice R. 873 the Commissioner of Police adds to this grim category
an astonishing range of peaceful conduct aimed to urge the state to release
people being held in detention without trial. This conduct itself may also be
illegal, but the Notice does not make it so; what the Notice does is to make
any statement encouraging such conduct "subversive." Conviction for the of-
fense of uttering a subversive statement carries a penalty of up to ten years in
29. For a discussion of the "selective boycott," see Powell, The 'desk' has put the bad old
days behind now, Weekly Mail, July 21-27, 1989, at 25, col. 4.
30. Claassen, Retain the Bar and Side-Bar, 87 S. AFR. L.J. 25, 25 (1970). A similar senti-
ment was captured by Sydney Kentridge, one of South Africa's most eminent anti-apartheid
lawyers, in his account of a speech he gave "at a law dinner at which some Supreme Court
judges were present.... I said that I believed that we still had the best judiciary in Africa. It
was clear that those most immediately concerned thought this compliment wholly inadequate."
Kentridge, Telling the Truth About Law, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 648, 651 (1982).
31. Proclamation R. 224, Regulation 1(1) (definition of "subversive statement," part
(a)(ix)), 258 Gov't Gazette No. 10541, at 5 (Dec. 11, 1986).
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prison.3 2 To illustrate: by virtue of the Notice, if a South African urged a
friend to wear a T-shirt calling for the release of detainees, the person doing
the urging could be sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.33
Notice R. 873 is an egregious violation of principles of freedom of speech.
What it does is remarkable; how it does it is also striking. We will see later
that Notice R. 873's prohibitions are so inclusively phrased that they could
have been read to prohibit even more than the government claimed it meant to
reach.34 Here let us consider three other salient features of the Notice: its
misuse of language, its convolution, and its detail." Although not every
South African legal provision shares these characteristics, what we find in No-
tice R. 873 wil illuminate broader reaches of South African law as well.
First, the misuse of language is Orwellian, almost classically so, and no
doubt serves the familiar Orwellian purposes of coverup and propaganda.
Who but the Ministry of Love would label it "subversive" to urge someone to
sign a petition asking for the release of a person being held indefinitely without
trial? Even if we grant that the government's fears are so nightmarish that it
might sincerely see such peaceful advocacy as subversive, unmistakable in-
stances of Newspeak do exist. An example is the 1952 "Bantu (Abolition of
Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act," which in John Dugard's words
"did not in fact repeal the pass laws, but rather coordinated them by providing
for the carrying of 'reference books' instead of 'passes' and extended the ex-
isting laws by requiring women to carry reference books (passes) as well."3 6
Occasionally the government shrinks from altogether spelling out what it
is doing, although the laws remain designed to convey their meaning to those
who know their context. The statute granting "independence" to the so-called
homeland of Transkei, for example, defines the citizenship of the new country
in language that on its face transforms all or almost all South African whites
into Transkeians.37 Needless to say, the reader is expected to interpolate
"black" into the definition of Transkeian citizenship so as to avoid this result.
Second, the convolution of Notice R. 873 is striking. Though the Notice
32. Id. at 8, 10 (Regulations 5 & 8).
33. See Notice R. 873, supra note 1, at 2 (Schedule, paragraph (e)).
34. See infra text accompanying note 103.
35. It is also noteworthy that the text of the Notice, like "all bills, laws and notices of
general public importance or interest," appears in both English and Afrikaans. See Republic of
South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983, § 89(2). The use of these two languages is at
once an expression of the government's failure to accord African languages equal status with
those of European origin, and a reflection of the intense struggle waged by the Afrikaners to
secure the equality of their language with English.
36. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 75 (footnote omitted).
37. For example, the citizens of the newly independent Transkei include "every South
African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the Republic of South Africa, [and] is
not a citizen of Transkei" on one of the other grounds enumerated in the statute. Status of
Transkei Act No. 100 of 1976, Schedule B, paragraph (f). Since South African whites are
citizens of South Africa and are highly unlikely to be citizens of the "territories," that is to say
the black territories, the plain language of this section makes them Transkeians. See Ellmann,
Who Are the Citizens of South 4frica & Transkei?, 4 S. AER. J. HuM. RTs. 76 (1988).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1989-90]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
reflects a remarkably broad understanding of "subversive statements," this un-
derstanding is not explicitly acknowledged in the Notice itself. Instead, the
Notice achieves its effects in an awkward, even obscure, fashion. The Notice
does not define the term "subversive statements" itself, or say that statements
urging the forms of conduct specified in the Notice are subversive, or say that
those forms of conduct are themselves illegal. From the Notice we learn only
that for purposes of the definition of subversive statements contained in a sepa-
rate regulation, the conduct identified here is "an act which has the effect of
threatening the safety of the public [etc.]." Only in the regulation to which the
Notice refers, and not in the Notice itself, do we learn that if an act is so
identified, then a statement encouraging it is subversive.38
Why so convoluted? Surely one reason is simply habit, a habit by no
means unique to South African legal drafters. A second reason is actually
precision; to a professional lawyer the legal effect of this language may be quite
clear. Indeed, if the Commissioner had ventured an explanation of the legal
effect of the Notice, he might inadvertently have injected fresh legal complica-
tions that would have undercut the clarity and effect of what he meant to
achieve.39 Here, the Notice and its cross-reference may have been designed to
convey all, and only, that which the drafters intended.'
38. Albie Sachs provides a particularly elaborate example of such convolution in the
charge sheet in a case in which an Indian was convicted for swimming at a whites-only beach.
As Sachs writes:
The charge alleged that the accused was guilty of contravention of regulation 19(a)
read with regulations 18(b) and 23 of the regulations made by the Minister of Lands
published on 2nd February, 1962, in Government Gazette No. 169 under Notice No.
R. 168, further read with Government Notice No. 1090 dated 6th July, 1962, pub-
lished in Government Gazette No. 285 of 1962, further read with Provincial Notice
No. 37 of 1946, dated 1st August 1946, such regulations being made under section
10(1) of the Sea-shore Act, No. 21 of 1935, as amended, and as read with regulation
424 of Government Notice No. 201 published in the Government Gazette of 16th
March, 1962.
A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 148-49 (1973).
39. For an example of the potential pitfalls of the imprecise use of legal language in South
Africa, see State President and Others v. United Democratic Front and Others, 1989 (1) S.A.
766 (A). This case dealt with the decision by the South African government to prohibit the
United Democratic Front from receiving money from abroad. Such a prohibition, according to
the relevant statute, could only be issued if the Minister of Justice had taken certain steps first;
here, those steps had been taken by a different Minister, the Minister of Law and Order. An-
other statute, however, permitted the State President to "assign" functiofhs of one Minister to
another, and the State President had in fact issued a proclamation in which he "hereby ap-
prove[d]" the transfer of the responsibilities at issue here. The lower court held that a procla-
mation approving a transfer of responsibilities was not a proclamation actually assigning theso
responsibilities, and so determined that the prohibition issued against the United Democratic
Front was invalid. While this ruling was overturned on appeal, it illustrates the reasons for the
recurrent lawyerly concern about the risks of loose language.
40. On occasion, however, the complexity of cross-reference seems to overwhelm even the
legislators who vote for these provisions. Thus, in the 1986 Restoration of South African Citi-
zenship Act, by virtue of which South Africa appeared to restore citizenship to some of the
millions of Africans who had lost their citizenship when their "homelands" became independ-
ent, South African citizenship was offered to various groups of people who were permanently
resident in South Africa despite their loss of citizenship. See Restoration of South African
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A third reason for this complexity may be its subdivision, and so its dimi-
nution, of responsibility. The Commissioner of Police in Notice R. 873 does
not define "subversive statements," but only identifies certain acts as threaten-
ing to public order. What happens to people who urge others to commit those
acts has been decided elsewhere, in regulations promulgated by the State Pres-
ident. This is a familiar mechanism to blunt criticism or even to shunt away
guilt.
Such devices are useful to any government, and should be especially valu-
able to governments with a lot about which to feel guilty. We can see a similar
effort underway in the bland responses, or even "predictable... distortions
and denials of the truth,"'" from government agencies challenged by reports of
wrongdoing. For example, the South African Prisons Service, addressing re-
ports of the death of a young woman prisoner who allegedly had been
straitjacketed for twenty-four hours before being hospitalized, told the Weekly
Mail (a leading anti-apartheid newspaper) that "Itihe assurance can be given
that, as is customary of the Prisons Service, everything possible will be done to
have the matter clarified and properly dealt with."'4
But if legal complexity sometimes serves to mask responsibility, the cum-
bersome process of definition reflected in Notice R. 873 fails in this task. The
effect of the Commissioner's action is clear enough, and the coordination be-
tween the State President and the Commissioner is equally evident.
This observation brings us to the third striking feature of Notice K. 873
- the fact that the Notice is remarkably detailed in its delineation of the
conduct it intends to prohibit South Africans from encouraging. Since the
Notice begins by making it a "subversive statement" to urge anyone "[t]o par-
ticipate in any campaign, project or action aimed at accomplishing the release
of persons," it is not immediately obvious why all the subsidiary detail is nec-
essary. From one perspective, moreover, the detail is counterproductive, for it
exposes the government to equally detailed criticism, and thus hardly serves
Citizenship Act No. 73 of 1986, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5(1)(b) (requiring permanent residence for restora-
tion of citizenship); id. § 5(1)(c) (requiring compliance with provisions of section 10 of the
South African Citizenship Act No. 44 of 1949, which include lawful admission into South Af-
rica "for permanent residence" as a condition of grant of citizenship).
But another statute which went into effect just a few days before the Restoration Act, the
Matters Concerning Admission to and Residence in the Republic Amendment Act No. 53 of
1986, seemingly had just deprived all of these people of their right of permanent residence! If
these people were therefore ineligible for restoration of their citizenship, then the "Restoration
Act" was a bizarre and cruel joke. If, as seems more likely, the legislature did not intend to
enact such a Catch-22 into law, then the ambiguity of the language it did enact may reflect that
the legislators themselves had lost track of their own laws. For a detailed discussion of the
Restoration Act and the other laws with which it must somehow mesh, see Budlender, On
Citizenship & Residence Rights. Taking Words Seriously, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 37 (1989).
41. Paul Gaston uses this phrase in his report of the brave criticism of the government by
Helen Suzman, a member of the opposition Progressive Federal Party, during debate in the
South African parliament. Gaston, A Southerner in South Africa, 8 SOUTHERN CHANGES 9, 12
(1986).
42. Davis, Woman prisoner dies after "straitjacket ordeal," Weekly Mail, July 14-20, 1989,
at 3.
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the goals of blurring responsibility or of covering up what is afoot. Why not,
then, just ban all participation in all such campaigns?
It is not enough to say that the bureaucrats who drafted Notice R. 873
were pedantic and repressive people who provided such detail simply as a
mechanical explication of the full measure of their intentions. Rather, legal
language becomes detailed and repetitive for another reason as well. Lawyers
are paid to head off problems, and they write as they do in part for that
purpose.
The problems that the government's drafters confront are of two types.
First, the government faces a popular opposition that is creative and wide-
spread. Speeches may have to be controlled; so may rallies, petitions, mail-in
coupons, T-shirts, and "the performance of any act as a symbolic token of
solidarity with or in honour of" detainees.4 3 All of these acts - in themselves
just forms of peaceful political expression - may be part of the "total on-
slaught" against South Africa that the government has claimed is under
way.' In the words of a judge who reflected "the siege mentality which domi-
nates white politics,"45 the country faces "domestic turbulence... accompa-
nied and intensified by a mounting political, psychological, socio-economic
and terror onslaught upon the Republic of South Africa from beyond its bor-
ders .... And the South African community has already been gravely hurt by
this domestic turbulence and foreign onslaught."46
To some extent, the government's use of such rhetoric has probably been
propaganda cynically designed to whip up the fears of white voters, but this
rhetoric has also reflected the government's perception of reality.47 Certainly
the government does believe that the opposition exists. Blacks outnumber
whites in South Africa by more than five to one.48 Black opposition can be
and has been punished again and again,49 but since the development of the
43. Each of these forms of protest is covered in the Schedule included in Notice R. 873.
For the quoted language, see Notice R. 873, supra note 1 (Schedule, paragraph (g)).
44. Dennis Davis wrote in 1987 that "it has now become almost standard practice for the
state to defend the emergency regulations in court applications by producing replying affidavits
containing lengthy descriptions and analyses of the 'total onslaught' against South Africa."
Davis, The Chief Justice & the Total Onslaught, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 229, 229 (1987).
45. Cameron, Judicial Endorsement of Apartheid Propaganda: An Enquiry Into An Acute
Case, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 223, 228 (1987).
46. Bloem and Another v. State President and Others, 1986 (4) S.A. 1064 (0) at 1068B-C
(judgment of M.T. Steyn, J.).
47. Dennis Davis emphasizes the government's acceptance of this perspective. Letter from
Dennis Davis to Stephen Ellmann (June 22, 1990) (on file with author); A. SPARKS, THE MIND
oF SouTH AFRICA 309-15, 354-60 (1990).
48. The South African Institute of Race Relations estimates the total 1987 population of
South Africa (including the so-called "independent homelands" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana,
Venda, and Ciskei) as 35,206,898 people, including 26,313,898 Africans (74.7% of the total),
913,000 Asians (2.6%), 3,069,000 "Coloureds" (8.7%), and 4,911,000 whites (14.0%). S. AER.
INST. RACE REL., RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1987/88, at 10-11 (1988).
49. Leaders of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South
African Students Organization, and the United Democratic Front, as well as many other less
prominent people, have suffiered severe penalties for their acts in the struggle against apartheid.
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black consciousness movement led by Steve Biko, beginning in the late 1960s,
new movements have arisen repeatedly from the ashes of the old."0 In every
walk of South African life, from education to music to drama to medicine to
law, and of course in politics, opposition to the government is vibrantly
expressed. 1
The South African government sees itself engulfed, and fears the del-
uge 2 For those who seek to stop such a tide, there can be no innocent, peace-
ful forms of political expression. Every stand against the government in
greater or lesser measure challenges the shaky equilibrium on which the state
now rests. All must be controlled, and yet the very effort to multiply and
elaborate controls bespeaks the government's fear that all its work is no more
than a house of cards. We can read Notice R. 873 as an attempt to prohibit
each of the government's nightmares, and the state's decision not to rely on
some concise and sweeping prohibition as an indicator of the extent of its anxi-
ety and anger. As Joseph Lelyveld put it in describing the law of race in South
Africa, the writers of such laws are "[h]eedless of overkill. 5 3
But there is also a second, quite different reason for the elaborate detail of
Notice R. 873. The government's task of suppression requires unceasing vigi-
lance, not only in response to the incessant flowering of popular opposition,
but also against a second difficulty as well: the legal obstacles that lawyers
opposed to apartheid seek to erect against the government's abuse of its
power. South African law admits few, if any, absolute impediments to the
power of the state, but, as we will see in Part III, it hems in this power in
ways that create.a genuine risk of legal challenge to putatively authorized gov-
ernment acts.
The government turns to precision in part because language that is un-
mistakably clear may be needed to head off the sorts of legal challenges that
can be brought. For example, ambiguous statutory language may be inter-
preted in light of common law principles favoring human rights so that it does
not prohibit as much as its Parliamentary supporters intended. Regulations or
notices purporting to rest on statutory authority may be worded either too
loosely (so that they are void for vagueness) or too narrowly (so that again
they do not reach as far as their drafters had planned). For such ills as these,
50. The most striking recent example was the emergence of the "Mass Democratic Move-
ment," an amorphous but prominent grouping which filled part of the gap created by the gov-
ernment's use of its emergency powers virtually to ban the United Democratic Front in
February of 1988.
51. For examples of the diverse fields of anti-apartheid struggle, see Molefe, NECC meets
to discuss "education for all," Weekly Mail, Dec. 15-20, 1989, at 4, col. 2 (education);
Mkhwanazi, Sweet potato freedom, Weekly Mail, Dec. 15-20, 1989, at 27, col. 4 (anti-apartheid
nursery rhymes); Dobson, The musical's revitalized-but not the district, Weekly Mail, Dec. 8-
14, 1989, at 23, col. 1 (musical); Snubbed SACOS links up with PAC, Weekly Mail, Dec. 1-7,
1989, at 35, col. 1 (sport).
52. Nelson Mandela has taken note of "[t]he fears of whites about their rights and place in
a South Africa they do not control exclusively." See Excerpts From the Speech by Mandela in
Soweto, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
53. J. LELYVELD, supra note 2, at 88.
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elaborate detail may be the cure. To understand the significance of these pres-
sures for the character of the government's lawmaking, however, we need to
understand more fully the ways in which lawyers use the law against the
government.
III.
THE PRACTICE OF ANTI-APARTHEID LAW
If there were no massive popular struggle against apartheid, there would
surely be no massive legal struggle either. It is possible, however, to imagine a
mass political movement that operates entirely in political arenas rather than
in courtrooms, because the relevant laws are so unshakeably hostile to the
movement's aspirations, or because the lawyers who would have to press the
movement's cause are unwilling to take their cases, or because the movement's
members choose not to pursue judicial remedies. In South Africa, however,
legal challenges to the state's use of the law have a long history, and today
these efforts are widespread. Two distinctively legal factors contribute to the
vitality of this lawyerly struggle against apartheid: South African legal doc-
trine and the South African legal community. As we will see in this Section,
legal doctrine in South Africa provides the basis for substantial arguments
against many of the state's undertakings, while the structure and traditions of
the legal community provide strong social support for lawyers who take on the
task of making these arguments, as well as for judges who find them persua-
sive. As a result, legal opposition can pose a significant constraint on the gov-
ernment's use of law.
4. Doctrine
South Africa's constitutional thinking was shaped in large part by the
British. Britain has no written constitution, but it certainly has constitutional
principles. Perhaps the single most important of these has been the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty - a sovereignty so vast that Parliament can do
virtually anything it wishes. South Africa has embraced this concept.54
Such sovereignty is not automatically abused. Great Britain for much of
this century secured the liberty of its subjects quite well without any written
constitutional limitations such as the United States relies upon (and of course
even written constitutional provisions are not perfect)." But the effect of
granting such power to the lawmaking bodies of government is that unless
some political or moral restraint checks their hand, these agencies can trample
on the rights of the people. In a world of complete Parliamentary sovereignty
54. For an account of the development of South Africa's stance on parliamentary
supremacy, see J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 14-36.
55. Since 1953, the rights of British subjects have also been protected by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221. Since 1966, Britain has accepted "the right of individual petition to the [Euro-
pean] Commission [on Human Rights] and the compulsory jurisdiction of the [European] Court
[of Human Rights]." A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 16 & 24 n.40 (2d ed. 1977).
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courts have no power to overturn acts of Parliament as "unconstitutional."5 6
In theory, the courts' role is merely to give effect to the laws Parliament has
enacted, however repellent.
But courts in England - and in South Africa - have not acted quite the
way this theoretical account might suggest. Instead of passively enforcing the
various designs of Parliament, the courts have shaped rules of common law so
as to interpret the statutes Parliament enacts in (sometimes) decidedly hu-
mane ways. So, in South Africa, a country in which white oppression of
blacks has never ceased, the common law makes it:
the duty of the Courts to hold the scales evenly between the different
classes of the community and to declare invalid any practice which,
in the absence of the authority of an Act of Parliament results in
partial and unequal treatment to a substantial degree between differ-
ent sections of the community."
So, too, in a country where detention without trial has been widespread, com-
mon law principle obliges the state to give a hearing to those whose rights it
proposes to impair.5" And in a land so long and ferociously committed to
repression, a dissenting judge recently catalogued a number of benign canons
of construction, for each of which he cited prior authority:
that where a statute is reasonably capable of more than one meaning,
a Court will give it the meaning which least interferes with the lib-
erty of the individual... , that a strict construction is placed on
statutory provisions which interfere with elementary rights..., that
a statute is not presumed to take away prior existing rights... and
that an interpretation which avoids harshness and injustice will, if
possible, be adopted.59
Perhaps the best-known instance of this creative judicial interpretation of
Parliamentary intention in recent years is the Hurley case.6° Hurley dealt with
a statutory "ouster" clause, which denied the courts any "jurisdiction to pro-
nounce upon the validity of any action taken in terms of this section [which
authorized detention without trial in specified circumstances), or to order the
release of any person detained in terms of the provisions of this section."
6
'
The court in Hurley decided that a detention ordered without the justification
required by the statute was not an "action taken in terms of this section," and
56. While South Africa's Constitution does not altogether exclude judicial review of the
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, that power is expressly and seemingly narrowly circum-
scribed. See Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 1983, § 34.
57. Rex v. Abdurahman, 1950 (3) S.A. 136 (A) at 145C.
58. South Africa's highest court has agreed that this principle, expressed in the maxim
audi alteram partem, "embodies a fundamental right." Omar and Others v. Minister of Law
and Order and Others, 1987 (3) S.A. 859 (A) at 893E-F.
59. Tshwete v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1988 (4) S.A. 586 (A) at 612F-H (Nestadt JA,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
60. Minister of Law and Order and Others v. Hurley and Another, 1986 (3) S.A. 568 (A).
61. Internal Security Act No. 74 of 1982, § 29(6).
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so the courts were not deprived of their power to pronounce upon it or to
order the release of the person unlawfully detained.62 In other words, the
ouster clause ousted little or nothing.
Parliament can override any of these common law principles, to be sure,
but it must do so clearly. The requisite clarity is not always easy to achieve,
especially if the courts are sufficiently determined to hold a statute's meaning
to a benignly narrow reading of its words. Moreover, clarity may come at a
price - for what has been set out clearly cannot be so easily obscured from
scrutiny and criticism. In Notice R. 873, we can see how far the government
may have to go if it is to escape ambiguity.
Let us take one example. Merely to bar advocacy of "participat[ion] in
any campaign, project or action aimed at accomplishing the release of per-
sons" might not be enough to make it an offense to encourage others to sign a
petition. Signing a petition, after all, might not be the kind of involvement
that amounts to "participation." A petition might not amount to a "cam-
paign," for that term might be read to refer to political mobilization much
more intense than the collection of individual signatures on a petition, and a
petition might not even be a "project or action" if those two terms were con-
strued as referring only to conduct approaching a "campaign."
Perhaps these arguments seem strained. But the Acting Chief Justice of
South Africa's highest court ruled in 1988 that "[in the context in which
'action' is used in the notice [R. 873] with the words 'campaign' and 'project,'
it implies more than an 'act' and has, in my opinion, the wider meaning of an
organized action."63 And so, although the government does not abandon
broad language in Notice R. 873, the Notice still prohibits "the performance
of any act as a symbolic token of solidarity with" a detainee, it has good rea-
son to spell out everything it can.
The government would not need to go into such detail simply because
various doctrines favoring human rights are on the books. The legal details
become necessary only if there are people who will point out their absence,
and make that absence matter. This is not a task exclusively for lawyers and
judges, but it is one for which they are specially trained.
To be blunt, lawyers are experts at technicalities. South African human
rights lawyers are, I think, even more expert in this respect than their Ameri-
can counterparts, precisely because South African lawyers cannot invoke
broad constitutional principles to override repellent legislation, but must in-
stead channel their advocacy into the "interpretation" of Parliamentary com-
mands. Notice R. 873's ponderous detail, then, is partly a defense against the
62. Hurley, 1986 (3) S.A. 568 (A) at 584A-586I.
63. State President and Others v. Release Mandela Campaign and Others, 1988 (4) S.A.
903 (A) at 9081-909A. I rely, in citations to this case, primarily on a translation done from the
manuscript (typed) judgment by Ms. Nadine Havenga. (The Afrikaans title of this case is
"Staatspresident en Andere v. Release Mandela Campaign en Andere.")
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intricate web of technical reasoning in which the government's adversaries
might ensnare it.
Not only "might" ensnare it, but would. Lawyering against the govern-
ment is not another grim fantasy of those in power, but rather an everyday
reality in South Africa. Some of the lawyers doing this work are black; black
people in South Africa are unrepresented in Parliament but they can represent
clients of any race in court."4 Others are white, "Coloured" (mixed-race), or
Indian. In the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, in Lawyers for
Human Rights, in the Black Lawyers Association, and in other groupings,
lawyers have come together to express their revulsion against apartheid. In
case after case, individual lawyers have worked to limit the government's
power by invoking common law doctrines to limit the scope and impact of
repressive statutes.65 In some of these cases, though by no means all, their
arguments have been vindicated by the courts. We should now explore the
features of the legal community that encourage lawyers and judges to use the
law against apartheid.
B. The Structure and Traditions of the Legal Community
The fact that legal tools are available does not mean that lawyers will
employ them. The decision to use legal tools against apartheid is, in an impor-
tant sense, an individual decision, and I will briefly sketch the grounds on
which lawyers might reach it. But the likelihood that individuals will make
this choice is also affected by social and institutional factors that render this
decision harder or easier to stand by, and my principal focus in this Section
will be on identifying these underlying factors that help sustain anti-apartheid
law in South Africa.
Why would a lawyer decide to use law against the state? The answer to
this question may seem obvious, and can be put in the form of another ques-
tion: what else can lawyers do but use the tools of the law? This response is
too easy, for lawyers can leave the practice of law and opponents of apartheid
64. The text uses "black" in a narrow sense, to refer only to "Africans" and not to others,
classified by South Africa as "Coloureds" or "Indians," who might well also consider them-
selves black. According to a 1987 article, slightly less than a seventh of South Africa's lawyers
were black (including "Coloureds" and Indians). Mokgatle, The Exclusion of Blacks from the
South African Judicial System, 3 S. AFR. . HuM. RTs. 44, 46 (1987). This presence of black
lawyers is at once a testimony to the efforts of black South Africans and a reflection of the
difficulties that blacks contemplating a legal career still face.
65. The cases which they have handled have covered a wide range of issues, including
challenges to provisions issued under the state of emergency, such as the challenge to Notice R.
873 itself; the defense of individuals charged with political crimes against the state, see, ag,
Karis, The South African Treason Trial, 76 PoL Sci. Q. 217 (1961); and advocacy on behalf of
communities facing forced removal, see White, supra note 21.
While anti-apartheid lawyering characteristically invokes the common law to constrain
statutes, it should be mentioned that in one important sphere - labor law - a reformist statute
has been used to secure for black workers rights considerably more substantial than those they
might otherwise have been able to claim under the common law. See, ag., Marievale Consoli-
dated Mines v. President, Industrial Court, 1986 (2) S.A. 485 () at 498D-4991.
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who are still choosing careers can avoid the legal profession. But it is quite
possible that many of those who practice anti-apartheid law do so because
they have assessed the tactical options open to those opposed to apartheid,
taken account of their own particular abilities and training, and decided that
working within the legal system is as attractive and effective a tactic as any -
at least for them. Lawyers could hold this view without in any way denying
the realities of South Africa. They need not claim that law is likely to be the
central force in changing South Africa, for they might well conclude that law-
yers' work can help a broader political mobilization to gather strength. They
can even acknowledge (with good reason) that their efforts will often be unsuc-
cessful. There are no simple ways to defeat apartheid, after all. Even a court-
room defeat may be significant politically for the glimpse of South African
reality that it offers to the public; defeats, as well as victories, may undercut
the very legitimacy the government may hope to achieve through its reliance
on law. Moreover, as we will see, lawyers against the state can sometimes win
meaningful victories, victories that at least help individual clients and may
have broader impact as well. The fact that victims of apartheid so consistently
welcome legal representation confirms that these considerations should not be
dismissed.
It might be hard, however, to sustain a commitment nourished only by
such somber tactical judgments. Many lawyers, I think, see other value to
their work as well. Some believe that the effort to give meaning to the law's
ideals is important because it will help give those ideals credibility in a post-
apartheid South Africa. Others may feel that even if they rarely can secure
judgments in their clients' favor, their efforts nonetheless amount to a moral
witness against injustice. Still others may see the fact that clients ask for their
help as itself sufficient justification for their efforts. And (since lawyers work-
ing against apartheid are human too) there may be some who are in it partly
for such selfish reasons as "the money." In any event, there are many South
African lawyers who struggle against their nation's legal oppression.
These lawyers have made decisions growing out of their own personal
values and desires, but particular features of the South African legal commu-
nity encourage lawyers to use the law against the state. In focusing here on
aspects of this professional environment, I do not mean to suggest that lawyers
exist apart from the larger society. On the contrary, the growing sentiment for
change among most South Africans undoubtedly has catalyzed the growing
efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers. Here, however, I want to focus on three
features of the legal community which also contribute to the vigor of today's
anti-apartheid lawyering: the great prestige of many of the individual lawyers
who have undertaken this role, the institution of the independent bar, and the
tradition of judicial independence.
First, the prestige of individual lawyers who have opposed apartheid is of
institutional importance because their presence and status lend protection -
indeed, even the weight of tradition - to less prominent men and women who
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hope to undertake similar work." In some societies, perhaps, lawyers who
adopt an anti-government stance tend to become outcasts within their own
profession: generally tolerated, occasionally able to be obstructive, but rarely
enjoying open respect from their peers. In South Africa, however, some of the
most successful and prestigious lawyers have also been firmly opposed to as-
pects of government policies.67
While the fact that such highly regarded lawyers are involved in chal-
lenges to apartheid surely helps others to join in the struggle, we must also ask
why opposition to the government has not destroyed the prestige of even these
prominent lawyers. The answer to this question lies partly in the historic in-
dependence of the bar and the judiciary, to which we will turn in a moment.
The echoes of other conflicts in South African society, however, may also play
a role. In particular, many of these eminent lawyers have been English-,
rather than Afrikaans-speaking, and it may be that the historic, multi-faceted
division within the white community between the English and the Afrikaners
- a division with class, cultural, and political ramifications - has helped fuel
lawyers' opposition to the state.6" Yet this is not a complete explanation. In-
deed, perhaps the most celebrated of all anti-apartheid lawyers was an
Afrikaner, Abram Fischer.69
Fischer's life illustrates not only the extent of some lawyers' commitment
against apartheid but also the almost tangible quality of the prestige which an
anti-apartheid lawyer can enjoy in South Africa. Fischer was a prominent
advocate, so highly regarded by his fellow lawyers that after his indictment in
1964 for membership in and support of the Communist Party, he was granted
bail and allowed to leave South Africa to argue a case in England - despite
the obvious possibility that he would escape trial by failing to return. His
lawyer told the court "that Mr. Fischer's colleagues at the Bar are confident of
the fact that Mr. Fischer, no matter what he is charged with here, is the sort of
man that will stand his trial and they equally would put up any sum of money
66. Albie Sachs speaks of "a liberal tradition in the legal profession." A. SACHS, supra
note 38, at 136.
67. Two examples from earlier in this century will suffice. The second Chief Justice of
South Africa, Sir James Rose-Innes, "[b]efore his elevation to the Bench... had been well
known as a liberal in Cape politics, and after his retirement he spoke out strongly against at-
tempts to deprive Africans of their limited franchise rights in the Cape." Id. In the 1950's,
"Chief Justice Centlivres was a conservative liberal from the Cape Bar, who was not particu-
larly active in politics before he became a judge but who on his retirement was to be a vigorous
critic of the effects of apartheid on the Rule of Law." Id. at 143.
68. Gail Gerhart has pointed out to me how many of these lawyers were not only English-
speaking but Jewish. As she suggests, Jews in South Africa after World War II may well have
found the policies of the Nationalist government particularly unattractive because the National
Party included people who had sided with the Nazis during World War II or had sharp anti-
Semitic views. On this aspect of Afrikaner politics, see D. HARRISON, THE WHITE TRIBE OF
AFRICA 114-32 (1985).
69. Fischer was an inspiration for the character of Dr. Burger in Nadine Gordiner's
novel, Burger's Daughter. Cf. Sampson, Heroism in South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1979,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 1 (reviewing N. GORDIMER, BURGER's DAUGHTER (1979)). For a
poignant memory of his life, see Benson, A True Afrikaner, 19 GRANTA 197 (1986).
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at all, no matter how large it is, to guarantee his return."70
Such prestige is a tribute to anti-apartheid lawyers' ability and integrity,
but it is also, I believe, a product of the second aspect of the South African
legal community that we need to address: the structure of the legal profession.
That structure has highly traditional and elitist features; I will suggest that
these very features provide insulation for lawyers who take up the cause of
challenging apartheid.
We must first understand the basic contours of the South African legal
profession. In the United States, the bar is formally an egalitarian institution:
in general, any duly admitted lawyer can handle any case in or out of court.
By contrast, South Africa, like England, has a divided bar - divided, that is,
between 900 advocates, who alone are empowered to argue cases in South
Africa's highest courts (the Supreme Courts),71 and 6700 attorneys, who can
and do appear in lower courts but otherwise are limited to out-of-court work
and to "briefing" advocates for Supreme Court cases. 72 Because the advo-
cates' profession seems to have provided particularly fertile soil for anti-
apartheid lawyering, let us focus on it first.
Advocates are at once subdivided and united in important ways; both of
these aspects of the structure of the profession may well contribute to the
strength of anti-apartheid lawyering. On the one hand, even advocates are
stratified. Junior advocates may be "led" by senior advocates in court. The
most respected members of the bar (advocates comprise "the bar") can, after
screening by the bar and the judiciary and ultimate approval by the govern-
ment, be designated as Senior Counsel, who command higher fees for the abil-
ity and prestige they bring to the most difficult cases. Those who rise to
become senior counsel have so far almost all been white, and they are likely to
share habits of mind acquired through the socialization process at the bar. If
they are far from representative of South African society as a whole, however,
they do hold a wide range of political views. Whether or not the process of
appointment of senior counsel generally escapes political distortion, it is be-
yond question that the Nationalist white government has approved the Senior
Counsel title for a number of determined opponents of apartheid. The result is
that in an institution in which hierarchy is rather firmly entrenched, some of
70. Society of Advocates v. Fischer, 1966 (1) S.A. 133 (T) at 134E. Fischer did return to
South Africa, but ultimately chose to go underground. After his capture he was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Before his sentencing he told the court that "[i]t was to keep faith with all
those dispossessed by apartheid that I broke my undertaking to the court, separated myself
from my family, pretended I was someone else, and accepted the life of a fugitive. I owed it to
the political prisoners, to the banished, to the silenced and those under house arrest, not to
remain a spectator, but to act." Benson, supra note 69, at 221 (quoting Fischer's words to the
court).
71. The Supreme Courts try certain cases, and exercise appellate jurisdiction over trials
held before magistrates. South Africa's counterpart to the United States Supreme Court is the
"Appellate Division" of its Supreme Court.
72. The statistics on the numbers of advocates and attorneys are drawn from Benson, The
Future of the Legal Profession in South Africa: Is Fusion the Answer? The English Experience,
105 S. AFR. L.J. 421, 422, 425 (1988).
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those who reap the prestige of the top rung of the ladder are leading anti-
apartheid lawyers.
At the same time, all advocates are heirs to a tradition of independence
from outside control. In the United States, lawyers join corporate firms, or
work for unions, or do plaintiffs' personal injury cases, or represent criminal
defendants. Switching sides is relatively infrequent. In South Africa, each
member of the bar is, in principle, a sole practitioner. In theory, moreover,
every advocate is normally bound to take cases in the order of their arrival in
her chambers. There are, however, exceptions to this requirement,73 and, even
aside from these exceptions, in practice cases no doubt tend to come to those
advocates who have evinced an interest in doing them. Thus, the professional
neutrality of advocates is by no means a complete reality. Yet the ideal which
this institutional structure suggests - that it is an advocate's responsibility,
and pride, to represent any litigant - remains significant. Men and women
schooled to independence from the pressures of clients may also be prepared
for independence from the broader pressures of white society and its govern-
ment. Even if this ideal does not directly inspire anti-apartheid lawyering, it
offers a shield against criticism of those advocates who do in fact take cases
challenging the government.
Free (in theory) of indebtedness to any single client or interest, advocates
battle each other, but also are bound to each other. This tradition of fraternity
within their own ranks may well provide a further protection for those mem-
bers of the club whose conduct outsiders might attack. 4 At one time, advo-
cates would all have been white, almost all male, and most probably English-
speaking. But I think the traditional fraternity among advocates has not spent
its force, even though their ranks have come to include more Afrikaners, as
well as some women and blacks.75 I spent time one day in 1988 with a black
73. Perhaps the most important is that advocates may accept a retainer lasting up to one
year from a client, and when they do so they do give up some of the independence they would
otherwise possess. See Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics of the General Council of the Bar
as Adopted by the Johannesburg Bar, Rule 5.2, in RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE
JOHANNESBURG BAR (1986) [hereinafter Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics]. Exceptions
are also sometimes made to allow advocates to be employed by public interest law organiza-
tions. See Annexure to Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics, Local Rules and Practice of the
Johannesburg Bar, Rule 3, in RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE JOHANNESBURG BAR
(1986).
74. Saint Paul is said to have protected himself from whipping at the hands of his jailers by
invoking his status as a Roman citizen. Acts 22:25-29. As Roman citizenship shielded even an
apostle of a reviled religion, so bar membership may have helped protect the advocates of the
anti-apartheid cause.
75. In fact, certain elements of this fellowship are enjoined upon advocates by rule. Ac-
cording to a Note to Rule 1.3 of the Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics:
A new member should introduce himself or herself to every other member of the Bar.
This should be done by visiting each member in his or her chambers.... One member
must not address or refer to another male member as "Mr." Surnames should be used
except in those cases where members are on first names relationship. In the case of
female members the usual rules of courtesy apply and they should be addressed and
referred to as 'Miss" or [']Mrs" as the case may be.
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advocate in South Africa. During the course of the day we took a drive - in
his BMW - through the parts of town where his parents had lived, but lived
no longer because they had been forced out when these areas were restricted to
whites. Later, in his chambers, he entertained the white advocate down the
hall, whose father had signed the order years earlier that had "banned" my
friend from normal life.76 And on our way out of the parking garage, he ex-
changed pleasantries with a white advocate who had vigorously sought to keep
blacks out of the ranks of advocates.
The notion of a small elite group of lawyers beholden to no one but them-
selves (and the judges) is not an entirely attractive one. Nor do I mean to say
that this structure by any means insures that an advocate will adopt an anti-
apartheid role. Though the tradition of independence may encourage some
advocates to see injustices they would otherwise ignore, much of lawyers' lives
may also dispose them to conservatism. South African observers have noted
"[t]he part played, in parliament and out, by practising or formerly practising
advocates in the enervation of the principles of justice and the rule of law in
this country over the past decades."" I do mean to argue, however, that
South African advocates who are opposed to apartheid, whether as a result of
experience at the bar or for other reasons, benefit from the traditional elite
independence of the bar, just as they make use of the technicalities of the law.
The prestige and the protection against outside criticism which this hierarchi-
cal and exclusive structure confers, I suggest, contributes to fostering the "in-
domitability in the pursuit of justice" that some members of the bar display.78
But what of the attorneys who do not have the special institutional ar-
rangements and status of advocates but do handle a great deal of important
legal work in South Africa? Historically, it appears that attorneys have been a
more conservative group than advocates. In part, this difference may reflect
that attorneys have had neither such strong structural self-protection nor so
many prominent individual exemplars of liberal opposition to government pol-
icies as advocates have enjoyed. Other political and cultural differences be-
tween the two sets of lawyers have probably also played a role. Nonetheless
there have been anti-apartheid attorneys, as well as advocates, for many
years,7 9 and today their numbers are significant.8" No doubt these attorneys'
anti-apartheid beliefs and efforts have many sources. It does seem reasonable
to infer, however, that the strength of the anti-apartheid bar has provided in-
76. It was no accident that another advocate was down the hall, for almost all advocates'
"chambers" or offices are in just one or two buildings in any given city. This, in itself, may
contribute to the bonding of the bar. For a romantic expression of this view, see Claassen, supra
note 30, at 26.
77. Cameron, Rudolph & van Zyl Smit, Judicial Appointments - Public Confidence and
the Court Structure: Proposals for a New Approach, DE REBUS, Sept. 1980, at 430.
78. Id.
79. Perhaps the most famous anti-apartheid attorney is Nelson Mandela, who practiced
law with his partner Oliver Tambo.
80. This sketch of the position of attorneys in South Africa owes much to comments from
attorney Geoff Budlender of the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg.
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spiration and protection to anti-apartheid attorneys, whose professional struc-
ture by itself might not have encouraged independence so well. Ironically,
then, the elitist nature of the bar - whose claims of superiority must often be
grating to attorneys - indirectly may have helped to foster anti-apartheid
efforts among attorneys as well."'
The third source of support in the South African legal community for
anti-apartheid lawyering is the independence of the Supreme Court judici-
ary. 2 As we will see, the traditions and institutional position of the judiciary
have resulted in the presence on the bench of a significant number of relatively
liberal judges. Their role is a morally difficult one, for they may feel con-
strained by fidelity to the law to enforce laws that are part and parcel of the
injustice of apartheid. Nonetheless, the presence of liberal judges is significant
and valuable for the viability of anti-apartheid law, not only because it means
that claims against the state have more chance of prevailing, but also because
the potential for a receptive hearing encourages anti-apartheid lawyers to con-
tinue their efforts. The result is that the state must write such laws as Notice
R. 873 with the judges, as well as the lawyers, in mind.
The presence on the bench of people opposed to aspects, or even all, of
apartheid is at first blush paradoxical. The government, after all, appoints
every judge, and the National Party, the party of apartheid, has been in power
since 1948! Yet by no means can every judge be relied upon to vote with the
government. In fact, as many as a quarter of the 120 Supreme Court judges
may be "troubled by their office and seem to be determined to dissociate them-
81. In making this argument, I do not mean to take a position on the desirability of main-
taining a divided bar. My purpose, rather, is to explore the ways that the institutional struc-
tures now in place have contributed to the flowering of anti-apartheid legal practice.
An account of the structure of the legal profession would not be complete without some
mention of money. If lawyers are surprisingly independent of the government, after all, they are
not independent of the need to earn a living. Opponents of apartheid who are unlucky enough
to be snared in the government's enforcement machinery are not likely to be able to afford a
full-throttle legal defense. South Africa, however, does not exist in a vacuum. South African
lawyers have adapted models of public interest law developed elsewhere, and have looked
abroad for much of the funding for their efforts as welL These efforts have sustained a substan-
tial volume of legal work, though far less than what South Africa's black citizens could use.
The availability of foreign support may also have helped anti-apartheid lawyers to feel less
isolated and beleaguered than they otherwise would. And while the government could block
the foreign funding, that step could have costs for the state in terms of both domestic politics
and international reaction.
82. It is important to remember that a wide range of legal matters are handled initially by
magistrates, subject to appellate oversight by the Supreme Court. A member of the Appdlate
Division of the Supreme Court has commented quite bluntly on the conditions that call the
independence of the magistrates into question. For example, they "are appointed from within
the personnel of the Department of Justice - usually from amongst the ranks of the prosecu-
tors" - rather than from the independent bar. Milne, Speech by the Honourable Mr. Justice,4.
J. Milne to the Natal Law Society, 97 S. Aix. L.J. 453, 457 (1980). "Moreover, while no doubt
some magistrates can and do resist it, there is insidious pressure built into the promotion system
to please those who promote one to higher status and salary." Id. at 458. The work of anti-
apartheid lawyers before the magistrates can bear fruit all the same, but the Supreme Court is a
more welcoming forum.
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selves from the executive or, at least, to maintain a decent distance from the
executive."18 3
Three aspects of the judiciary help explain this state of affairs. First, al-
most every judge comes from the ranks of senior counsel.84 Judges, in other
words, are likely to be deeply imbued with the ethos of the bar, and the bar's
spirit, as we have seen, is both independent and somewhat liberal. Even so,
the impact of the practice of selecting judges from among the senior counsel
should not be exaggerated. Not every liberal senior counsel may be prepared
to accept the potential moral compromises entailed in enforcing the present
laws of South Africa, however benignly she might read them. The govern-
ment, for its part, can engineer a designation as senior counsel, and can select
less illustrious, but more conservative, senior counsel for elevation to the
bench. One prominent advocate has concluded "that over the past thirty
years political factors have been placed above merit - not only in appoint-
ments to the Bench but in promotions to the Appeals Court. This has un-
doubtedly led in many cases to better qualified people being passed over in
favour of others less worthy of appointment or promotion.""5 Yet the very
force of this criticism suggests that the principle of appointment on merit re-
tains considerable vitality. 6 Perhaps to avoid such criticism from the bar,
perhaps out of a belief that it can write its laws so as to neutralize liberal
judges' impact, 7 perhaps even out of some degree of adherence to the bar's
traditions, the government does appoint or promote judges whom it must ex-
pect to render distinctly liberal judgments.
Second, the judges have virtually life tenure once they are appointed.
They are subject to removal only by the State President in response to "an
address from each of the respective Houses of Parliament in the same session
praying for such removal on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity." 8 No
judge has ever been removed in this way. 9 Life tenure, in South Africa as in
the United States, gives judges the security to throw off whatever political
entanglements might otherwise cloud their vision.
Third, the bench has its own tradition of independence. In John
83. Dugard, The Judiciary in a State of National Crisis-with Special Reference to the
South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477, 487 (1987).
84. See G. CARPENTER, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257
& n. 15 (1987) (describing the general practice, and citing a "notable exception," L. C. Steyn, a
very influential and pro-Government Afrikaner judge).
85. Kentridge, supra note 30, at 652.
86. Indeed, Kentridge maintains that "we are entitled to expect" that the executive will
avoid purely political appointments. Id. at 651.
87. See The judiciary: A new liberal era, Financial Mail, Aug. 8, 1986, at 59, col. 1 (sug-
gesting that John Vorster, then Minister of Justice and later Prime Minister and State President,
took this cynical view in the 1960s).
88. Supreme Court Act No. 59 of 1959, § 10(7).
89. Milne, supra note 82, at 456. Milne notes that occasionally judges have agreed to
resign rather than face the scandal of the removal process. I know of no case, however, in
which the threat of removal stemmed from the government's desire to silence an anti-apartheid
judge.
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Dugard's words, the judiciary "prides itself on its independence and professes
allegiance to the legal traditions of the Western world." ° As early as the
1820s the courts began to play a role, albeit a limited one, as protectors of
blacks' rights."' In colonial days, judges of the Cape Supreme Court "fre-
quently handed down rulings which embarrassed the administration or the
police, and by so doing earned for themselves a reputation for independence
and impartiality.19 2 In the 1930s, one of South Africa's most respected chief
justices declared "that people of all races realise that when a man takes a seat
on our Bench, he strips himself of all predelictions and endeavours only to do
right to all manner of men according to Law."193 Clothed in this tradition,
even judges who might agree with many aspects of government programs have
held particular elements of the government's policies unlavful. 4
C. The Efficacy of Legal Challenges to the Government's Use of Law
Because of the availability of viable arguments, lawyers prepared to make
them, and judges prepared to hear them, those who seek to use the law against
the government sometimes win. Defendants charged with political crimes, for
example, are acquitted, and, at least recently, not only in exceptional cases.
According to data from a compilation of South African political trials that
concluded between October 1988 and February 1989, in fact, approximately
two-thirds of those charged either were acquitted or had the charges against
them withdrawn.
95
Sometimes the effect of lawyers' work and judges' decisions is even more
far-reaching. The demise of the hated, and hateful, pass laws can be traced, in
90. Dugard, supra note 83, at 487.
91. A. SACHS, supra note 38, at 36.
92. Id. at 66.
93. A Memorial to Sir William Solomon, 48 S. AFR. LJ. 150, 153 (1931) (address by Sir
James Rose-Innes).
94. One of the most striking examples may be the decision by Chief Justice Rumpff in
Komani N.O. v. Bantu Affairs Admin. Bd., Peninsula Area, 1980 (4) S.A. 448 (A), a case which
rejected part of the government's system of "influx control" over blacks' right to live in urban
areas.
95. See Human Rights Commission, 2 HUM. RTs. UPDATE (No. 1), at 7-17 (May 1989)
[hereinafter HUM. RTs. UPDATE]. The UPDATE does not record whether the defendants in
these cases had legal representation. I suspect that most did, because the severity of the charges
and the political significance of the cases likely would have prompted legal efforts. If some of
these acquittals or withdrawals of charges took place without lawyers, however, that may un-
derline the importance of the role played by vigilant judges (and perhaps by some magistrates as
well).
Though these figures are striking, their significance should not be exaggerated. The states
rate of success during this period may have been unusually low. Moreover, the data cited in the
text include cases in the so-called independent homelands, and one of these cases was extremely
large and (from the state's point of view) unsuccessful. Without these cases, the proportion of
failed prosecutions drops substantially, from two-thirds to about two-fifths (although even this
level is not low). Finally, it is important to note that when charges are withdrawn the govern-
ment may later file new charges. Only slightly less than one-seventh of all those charged were
actually acquitted (and even those acquitted might face further prosecution for other alleged
misdeeds).
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part, to successful court challenges to aspects of these laws. 96 Court decisions
and lawyers' efforts have helped protect the de facto residential integration of
certain officially all-white areas.97 And in the mid-1980s there were heady
days when it appeared the courts would substantially restrict the government's
emergency powers - such as those exercised in Notice R. 873. In fact, on
April 28, 1987, eighteen days after it was promulgated, Notice R. 873 was
declared invalid by a South African court. 8
The promise of the judicial challenge to the emergency, unfortunately,
was subsequently undercut by conservative votes and manipulations of the
Appellate Division, the country's highest court.99 The attack on Notice R.
873, in particular, ultimately failed on appeal. The case, State President and
Others v. Release Mandela Campaign and Others,1" is one of several decisions
by the Appellate Division that dealt major blows to legal challenges to the
state of emergency.
While there recently have been encouraging signs of a return to closer
judicial scrutiny of state power, 101 it should not surprise us that South Africa's
courts fall short of the mark as opponents of government policies. To say that
opponents of apartheid can sometimes win, and that the courts have a tradi-
tion of independence, is not to gainsay the fact that courts in every country,
the United States included, are courts of that country and are not likely to be
its sharpest critics.
Yet in the course of rejecting the legal challenge to Notice R. 873, the
Appellate Division also endorsed a somewhat tempered, though still very
broad, understanding of the range of conduct which the Notice proscribed.
The advocate attacking the Notice asked whether a minister who prayed with
a detainee as an act of solidarity might be guilty of a subversive statement
because his prayer was likely to encourage the detainee's family to do the same
(and, presumably, their prayer in solidarity would constitute an act proscribed
by subsection (g) of Notice R. 873). The court's answer was that so long as
the minister did not intend this result, the fact that his prayer encouraged the
family's prayers would not make him guilty of a subversive statement.10 2 This
interpretation kept open a sizable loophole, for many seemingly subversive
statements might escape punishment on the ground that they were not uttered
with the requisite intent.
In fact, Notice R. 873 meant still less than that - though it still meant a
96. See, e.g., Komani, 1980 (4) S.A. 448 (A).
97. See Gqubele, Vote CF, the posters urge the locals But wait... the locals are mostly
black, Weekly Mail, Oct. 14-20, 1988, at 11, col. 1.
98. See State President and Others v. Release Mandela Campaign and Others, 1988 (4)
S.A. 903 (A) at 906E-G.
99. See Haysom & Plasket, The War Against Law: Judicial Activism and the Appellate
Division, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 303 (1988).
100. 1988 (4) S.A. 903 (A).
101. Rickard, The Corbett court brings back first principles, Weekly Mail, Dec. 21, 1989 -
Jan. 18, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
102. Release Mandela Campaign, 1988 (4) S.A. at 909D-G.
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great deal. In response to media reports even before the legal challenge, the
Commissioner of Police had explained to the press that Notice R. 873 did not
prohibit any "interested party" from making representations for a detainee's
release, including but not limited to bringing court actions seeking the release;
did not prohibit prayers for a detainee's release in a bonafide religious gather-
ing; and did not prohibit people at political campaign rallies "from adopting a
standpoint in regard to the release of detainees."10 3 The broad phrasing of
Notice R. 873 could have been read to prohibit most, if not all, of these activi-
ties. Perhaps the drafters adopted this phrasing because they simply were in-
capable of finding more precisely honed language. Or perhaps the government
was quite content to issue a notice written so broadly that its "chilling effect"
would be pervasive, and backed off only in the face of political opposition.
It is no tribute to the South African Appellate Division, in any event, that
this court let language stand that could have prohibited such conduct. But it
is a sign of the political and legal force of ideas of a right to petition, of a right
to religious succor, and of a right to political freedom, that even in the midst
of the state of emergency, the government found itself giving its own notice a
narrowing interpretation.
There is a further irony to the decision in this case. Notice R. 873 was
promulgated on April 10, 1987 and held invalid on April 28, 1987. The Appel-
late Division did not overturn the lower court judgment until September 13,
1988. In the meantime, however, Notice R. 873 had presumably expired,
since the state of emergency under which it was issued ended in June of 1987.
The government renewed the state of emergency for another year, and did so
again the following year and the year after that. But it did not choose to
reissue and resuscitate Notice R. 873, even after the Appellate Division's
decision."
Perhaps the government mistakenly believed that the Appellate Division
would not endorse Notice R. 873. Perhaps the government simply felt that it
could better accomplish its goals by other means. These methods were no less
drastic. The most sweeping was probably the order, issued early in 1988,
prohibiting the Release Mandela Campaign, the Detainees Parents Support
Committee, and fifteen other organizations "from carrying on or performing
any activities or acts whatsoever." 10' Nevertheless, as we will see in a mo-
ment, the absence of Notice R. 873 may have made a difference to the eventual
103. Id. at 910E-G.
104. I am grateful to Gilbert Marcus and Lydia Levin of the Centre for Applied Legal
Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for explaining Notice R. 873's
ultimate fate to me, and to Gilbert Marcus and George Bizos for describing the government's
later effort to ban gatherings in support of detainees, see infra text accompanying notes 117-19.
105. Order No. 334, 272 Gov't Gazette No. 11157 (Feb. 24, 1988). On the same day, in
Order No. 335, id., the government barred the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the
country's largest trade union group, from a variety of political actions, including "the stirring-
up, by way of publicity campaigns, of opposition among members of the public or members of a
section of the public to... the detention of a person, or of persons belonging to a category of
persons... or towards the system of detention." Id. § 2(b)i).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1989-90]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
fate of detainees. To understand the effect that lawyers' use of the law may
have had, we must now consider the extent to which South Africa's legal cul-
ture overlaps with a domain of illegality.
IV.
THE DOMAINS OF LEGALITY AND ILLEGALITY
I have tried to sketch here a picture of a country in which oppression
acquires a grotesque explicitness through its embodiment in law, but in which
the very forces that press the government to work its will through law also
modestly constrain what the government can do. In South Africa, law is a
contested territory. So it may be in many nations, but in South Africa the
stakes and the intensity of the struggle are especially high. For the govern-
ment, the law is a source of power and legitimizes the use of that power, while
for the opponents of apartheid, the law is also a device for restraining that
very power and casting doubt on its legitimacy. Precisely because many of
those involved in this struggle over law see their efforts as part of a much more
fundamental struggle, however, a complete picture of the role of law in the
South African racial order cannot stop with what is legal.
Certainly those who wish to preserve or even intensify racial oppression
have not always stayed within the bounds of the law. Many Americans are
aware of Steven Biko's degrading death while in police custody. Since his
death, there has been strong evidence that torture of detainees has continued
to be widespread. Lawyers have been able to restrain this abuse in part, and at
times, but never completely. Perhaps even more alarming, South Africa has
recently seen a rash of unmistakably criminal attacks on anti-apartheid activ-
ists, whose buildings have been bombed and whose lives have been taken.106
Though there have been many such incidents, the authorities have reported
very little success in finding the perpetrators.10 7
In other words, the law does not exercise a hypnotic hold upon the law-
enforcers or their extralegal allies. For those who see the law solely as a tool
of control, it must be easy to decide to use other, more effective tools instead.
Even those pro-apartheid whites who do genuinely respect the ideal of the rule
of law may consider it necessary to qualify that respect.
106. For a compilation of such incidents, see D. WEBSTER & M. FRIEDMAN, SUP-
PRESSING APARTHEID'S OPPONENTS: REPRESSION AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY JUNE
1987 - MARCH 1989, at 24-31 (1989). This pamphlet was published in memory of one of its
authors, David Webster, who was himself assassinated on May 1, 1989.
107. In late 1989, a man on South Africa's death row forestalled his execution with the
sensational confession that he had been part of a police hit squad responsible for political kill-
ings. Powell, Death-Row policeman tells of SB "hit-squad," Weekly Mail, Oct. 20-26, 1989, at
1, col. 1. Other revelations soon followed, and commissions of inquiry were appointed. Unfor-
tunately, although the recent report of the Harms Commission, established to investigate much
of this violence, was sharply critical of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, a euphemistically named
government agency suspected of such crimes, it only found evidence justifying prosecution in
two of the "more than 70" murders within its purview. Ottaway, South African Judicial In-
quiry Fails to Find Blame in Activists'Murders, Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
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Such ideological twists should not be surprising. Western ideals have real
significance in South Africa, but South African apartheid flies in the face of
those ideals (at least as they have come to be understood since the defeat of
Hitler, the demise of legal segregation in the United States and the decoloniza-
tion of the Third World). Those who find no support for their racist beliefs in
a framework of human rights and the rule of law may choose to abandon the
framework rather than the beliefs - and those who do not honor the frame-
work in the first place will be even less restrained. In addition, self-defense
and national security are potent reasons for abridging human rights even in
standard Western thinking; extreme conditions breed extreme state conduct.
From this perspective, lawyers opposed to apartheid play a dangerous game.
The more effective they are in challenging apartheid law from within, the
more some proponents of apartheid may be tempted to resort to extra-legal
means to defend their power.
Those who oppose apartheid also have not always accepted the con-
straints of law. The African National Congress ["ANC"], for example,
mounted a modest, but evident, armed struggle against the government over a
period of almost three decades until it agreed in August 1990 to suspend this
aspect of its struggle.' Many other people refuse to accept the government's
restrictions on nonviolent opposition. One of the cascading events that pre-
ceded the freeing of Nelson Mandela, for example, was the campaign of nonvi-
olent civil disobedience launched by the "mass democratic movement." The
first target of this campaign was the segregation of health care; 109 other targets
included segregated buses' and beaches."' At the same time, organizations
restricted under the state of emergency began to "unban" themselves. Dul-
lab Omar, an advocate and a leader of the United Democratic Front, one of
the restricted organizations, declared that "[lt is now irrelevant whether
(State President) de Klerk lifts [the state of emergency] or not."' 13
The aftermath of Notice R. 873 reflects the uncertainty of the govern-
ment's legal grip on the men and women of South Africa. Early in 1989 the
great majority of the people detained under the state of emergency were re-
leased (though many or most were then placed under difficult, and even dan-
gerous, government-imposed restrictions)." 4 What led to their release was
108. See Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Update on the Transition Pro-
cess - Paper IM: The Pretoria Minute and Working Group Report ofAugust 6 1990 5-7 (Aug.
14, 1990).
109. After this week white hospitals can never be the same, Weekly Mail, Aug. 4-10, 1989,
at 1, col. 2.
110. Gunene, Price of a defier's bus fare: charges of conspiracy, Weekly Mail, Sept. 1-7,
1989, at 8, col. 1.
111. Brown, Evans & Davis, The next defiance step: the banned 'unban' themselves,
Weekly Mail, Aug. 18-24, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
112. Id.
113. Davis, Western Cape has some quiet before the storm, Weekly Mail, Sept. 22-28, 1989,
at 7, col. 5.
114. See Gunene, Detainees go free but trials on increase, Weekly Mail, Dec. 21, 1989 -
Jan. 18, 1990, at 11, col. 1.
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not court action or government initiative, but hunger strikes." s
Starting on January 23, 1989, detainees began going on hunger strikes,
arguably violating the regulations governing their conduct in prison. 1 16 The
hunger strikes, in turn, generated a great deal of public support in South Af-
rica and abroad, support which buttressed the detainees' struggle.
This outpouring of support suggests that the case challenging Notice R.
873 may have won a victory after all, even though the Appellate Division
defeated the challengers' legal arguments. For although the state had adopted
other harsh steps to control agitation in favor of detainees' release, the demise
of Notice R. 873 meant that the Notice's express, specific provisions making it
a subversive statement to urge a "campaign, project, or action" in support of
the detainees' release, or to encourage others to act in "symbolic token of
solidarity with or in honour of" the detainees, were no longer on the books.
Although other portions of the emergency regulations' definition of "sub-
versive statements" (or other legislation) might have been pressed into service,
the abandonment of Notice R. 873 weakened the state's potential argument
that these alternative provisions should be read to do what Notice R. 873 no
longer did. Hence it was legal, or at least arguably legal, to incite the wave of
sympathy fasts that became a highly visible expression of support for the de-
tainees. Even the state's ban on all gatherings in protest against detention or
in solidarity with detainees - a ban issued the day after the first fast began -
did not quench the movement's fire, as one fast after another took place in the
days and weeks following this new prohibition.1 1 7
As it happens the first fast in solidarity was apparently the one under-
taken on February 9, 1989 by a group of 42 lawyers.' 18 Lawyers were also the
immediate target of the government's ban on gatherings in support of detain-
ees, for this ban singled out a meeting "to be held under the banner of 'Law-
yers in Protest'" the next day. 19 In their fast and plans for this gathering,
lawyers took advantage of the legal space to which the absence of Notice R.
873 had contributed. But in moving so far beyond conventional legal tactics,
115. For a description of the hunger strikes through March 1989, see HUM. RTS. UPDATE,
supra note 95, at 48-59.
116. In 1987, it was forbidden for an emergency detainee to "commito an act with the
intention of endangering his life, injuring his health or otherwise conduct himself to the preju-
dice of good order and discipline." Notice R. 1300, § 20(1)(r), 264 Gov't Gazette No. 10775
(June 11, 1987). Each detainee was also barred from "caus[ing] discontent, agitation or insub-
ordination among his fellow detainees or participat[ing] in any conspiracy." Id. § 20(l)(n).
These specific provisions did not appear in the "Prison Emergency Regulations" issued in 1988,
but similar requirements would still have been in force by virtue of other, almost identical
provisions of the general prison regulations. See Prisons Regulations [under Prisons Act No. 8
of 1959, § 94], H4 99(1)(n), (s) (Centre for Applied Legal Studies compilation) (undated). (I
appreciate the assistance of Gilbert Marcus and Lydia Levin on the post-1987 rules.)
117. The ban was announced in Order No. 255, 284 Gov't Gazette No. 11705 (Feb. 10,
1989) [hereinafter Order No. 255]. For a chronology of sympathy fasts after the ban, see HUM.
RTS. UPDATE, supra note 93, at 53.
118. See HUM. RTs. UPDATE, supra note 95, at 53.
119. Order No. 255, supra note 117, § (a).
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these lawyers also signalled their recognition of the limits on what traditional
legal work by itself can accomplish. Lawyers in many countries share this
understanding, but in South Africa the fragility of law's claim to embody or
promote justice is always a part of the legal culture.
CONCLUSION: THE LAW OF A NEv SOUTH AFRICA
There is no better example of the intertwining of the legal and the illegal
in South Africa than the recent release of Nelson Mandela. Mandela, a prac-
ticing attorney in the 1950s who continued his legal studies while in prison,
was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 for trying to overthrow white rule
as a leader of the nascent military operations of the ANC. He emerged from
prison in 1990 a free man, ready to resume the leadership of the ANC - now
legalized for the first time in 30 years - and in his first public speech declared
his continued support for the ANC's armed struggle.' 20 In unbanning the
ANC and freeing its most revered leader, South Africa's new State President,
F.W. de Klerk, has in effect acknowledged that only by legalizing the illegal
can South Africa's ruling white minority hope to achieve a lasting, just racial
peace. In that possible future society, the law might cease to be a mere
weapon of opposing social forces and, instead, become a vehicle for arguing
over, and building, a new South Africa.
120. See Transcript of Mandela's Speech at Cape Town City Halk "Africa It Is Oursl["],
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at A15, col. 1; McFadden, Man in the NeKW Nelson Mandela, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
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GOVERNMENT NOTICE
MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER
No. R. 873 10 April 1987
NOTICE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE.-PUBLIC SAFETY ACT.
1953
Under the powers vested in me by paragraph (a) (ix) of
the definition of "subversive statement" in regulation I of
the regulations published under the Public Safety Act, 1953(Act 3 of 1953), by Proclamation R. 224 of I I December
1986. as amended, I, Pettus Johannes Coetzec. Commis.
sioner of the South African Police. hereby identify for the
purposes of the said definition the act specified in the
Schedule hereto as an act which has the effect of threatening
the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order or
of delaying the termination of the state of emergency.
I further determine that. unless the context otherwise
indicates, a word to which a meaning has been assigned in
the said regulations shall, where usea in the said Schedule,
have a corresponding meaning.
Signed at Pretoria on 10 April 1987.
P. J. COETZEE.
Commisioner of the South African Police.
SCHEDULE
To participate in any campaign, project or action aimed at
accomplishing the release of persons, or of persons belong-
ing to a particular category of persons or of a particular
person. detained under section 28 or 29 of the Internal Secu-
rity Act. 1982 (Act 74 of 1982). or regulation 3 of theSecurity Regulations. in so far as such participation in any
such campagn. project or action consists of any one or
more of the f llowing acts. namely-
(a) the signing of. subscribing to or other act in support
of a petition or other similar document in which the
Government or a member or representative of the
Government is called or is purported to be called upon
by the signatories, subscribers or supporters thereof




(b) the calling, either orally, in writing, by telegram or In
any other way whatsoever, upon the Government or
upon a member or representatre of the Goermment
to release the said persons or person from such dcten-
lion:
(c) the signing of. ubscribing to or other a:t in support
of. a document in which the detention of the said
persons or person is protested against or disapproved:
(d) the filling in of a coupon or other similar document
intended to be used for purposes or in support of a call
upon the Government or upon a member or reprcsen.
tative of the Government to release the said pcrsons or
person from such detention:
(e) the wearing in public of a sticker or an) article of
clothing or the exhibition in public of a poster or
sticker depicting a slogan protesting against or dis-
approving of the detention of the said persons or per-
son or supporting the release of the said persons or
person from such detention:
(f) the attending of a gathering held inprotest against the
detention of the said persons or person or in honour of
the said persons or person or in support of the release
of the said persons or person from such detention; or
(g) the performance of any act as a symbolic token of
solidarity with or in honour of the said persons or
person.
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